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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Casey Marie Wilson appeals from his conviction for possession of
methamphetamine.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Wilson with possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp. 36-37;
see also R., pp. 103, 110 (dismissing additional charges).) The case proceeded to trial,
following which a jury convicted Wilson. (R., pp. 123-25, 139-41, 157.) The district court
entered a judgment of conviction from which Wilson timely appealed. (R., pp. 203-08,
219-22.)
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ISSUES
Wilson states the issues on appeal as:
I.
Was there sufficient evidence that Mr. Wilson possessed
methamphetamine?
II.
Did the prosecutor impermissibly elicit testimony on Mr. Wilson’s
exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent?
III.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct during closing arguments?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
I.
Was evidence that the baggies containing the methamphetamine in question were
found among Wilson’s belongings, such as on the floor with the contents of his wallet and
in a trunk with his clothes, enough to prove actual or constructive possession?
II.
Is Wilson’s claim of fundamental error arising from the prosecution’s alleged use
of his silence to infer his guilt or to impeach him without merit because there is no evidence
Wilson ever invoked his right to silence?
III.
Is Wilson’s claim that the prosecutor’s comment on his failure to call a witness was
fundamental error contrary to established law allowing a prosecutor to comment on the
defendant’s choices to not present witnesses (other than the defendant himself)?
IV.
Has Wilson failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor’s comment mentioning that
Wilson had chosen to get an attorney and take the case to trial was fundamental error?
V.
Has Wilson failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor’s argument Wilson alleges
disparaged his defense amounted to fundamental error?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Evidence That The Baggies Containing The Methamphetamine In Question Were Found
Among Wilson’s Belongings Was Enough To Prove Actual Or Constructive Possession
A.

Introduction
A jury convicted Wilson of possession of methamphetamine. (R., p. 157.) On

appeal Wilson contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, challenging
the evidence supporting the element of possession. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-10.) Review
of the record shows that the evidence demonstrated that the baggies containing
methamphetamine were found among Wilson’s possessions, specifically among the
contents of his wallet that had been dumped on the floor and with his clothing that was
stored in a trunk. The jury’s verdict is therefore supported by substantial evidence.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope.” State v.

Lawyer, 150 Idaho 170, 172, 244 P.3d 1256, 1258 (Ct. App. 2010). “A finding of guilt
will not be overturned on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a
reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of
proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Hernandez,
167 Idaho 262, ___, 469 P.3d 49, 50 (Ct. App. 2020). The appellate court is “precluded
from substituting [its] judgment for that of the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, the
weight of the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.”
State v. Robran, 119 Idaho 285, 288, 805 P.2d 491, 494 (Ct. App. 1991). In addition, the
appellate court must “consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.”
State v. Coleman, 163 Idaho 671, 673, 417 P.3d 997, 999 (Ct. App. 2018).
3

C.

Substantial Evidence Supports The Jury Verdict
“A judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict will be upheld by this Court

so long as there exists substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could
conclude that the prosecution proved all essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Gneiting, 167 Idaho 133, ___, 468 P.3d 263, 266 (2020)
(quotation marks omitted). “Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would
accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted). Review of the trial record shows substantial evidence
supporting the jury’s verdict.
“It is unlawful for any person to possess” methamphetamine without a legal
justification. I.C. §§ 37-2732(c)(1), 37-2707(d)(3). “Possession may be either actual or
constructive.” State v. Southwick, 158 Idaho 173, 178, 345 P.3d 232, 237 (Ct. App. 2014).
“An individual is in constructive possession if the individual had knowledge and control
of the substance.” State v. Zentner, 134 Idaho 508, 510, 5 P.3d 488, 490 (Ct. App. 2000).
Constructive possession exists “where a nexus between the accused and the controlled
substance is sufficiently proven so as to give rise to the reasonable inference that the
accused was not simply a bystander but, rather, had the power and the intent to exercise
dominion or control.” State v. Garza, 112 Idaho 778, 784, 735 P.2d 1089, 1095 (Ct. App.
1987). “Constructive possession may be joint or exclusive.” State v. Blake, 133 Idaho
237, 242, 985 P.2d 117, 122 (1999). The evidence presented at trial shows a nexus between
Wilson and the baggies of methamphetamine giving rise to a reasonable inference that he
exercised actual or constructive possession.
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Law enforcement executed a search warrant at 1509 Juniper Street North in Twin
Falls, Idaho. (9/18/19 Tr., p. 109, L. 24 – p. 111, L. 10; p. 165, L. 2 – p. 167, L. 2; p. 196,
L. 13 – p. 198, L. 3; State’s Exhibit 1.1.) Officers breached a downstairs bedroom door in
the residence when its occupants, Wilson and Tabatha New, refused to open it. (9/18/19
Tr., p. 111, L. 23 – p. 113, L. 20; p. 167, L. 5 – p. 169, L. 1; State’s Exhibit 1.4.) Wilson
was standing near a bed when the officers detained him and New and searched them.
(9/18/19 Tr., p. 113, L. 25 – p. 115, L. 16; p. 169, L. 7 – p. 170, L. 3.) After removing
Wilson and New, the officers searched the room and found a plastic bag with traces of
methamphetamine in it, Wilson’s and New’s identification, some cash, and other items
“[o]n the floor next to where Mr. Wilson was standing.” (9/18/19 Tr., p. 148, L. 17 – p.
149, L. 15; p. 160, Ls. 11-24; p. 170, L. 19 – p. 173, L. 4; p. 176, L. 8 – p. 177, L. 19; p.
201, L. 13 – p. 203, L. 12; p. 207, Ls. 14-24; State’s Exhibit 1.8-1.16, 2.) Officers also
found a scale and a baggie of methamphetamine inside a flashlight in a trunk in the room
that contained clothing. (9/18/19 Tr., p. 172, L. 17 – p. 174, L. 13.)
The lead detective spoke to Wilson, who stated that he was staying in the home,
had spent the previous night there, and both he and Tabatha New had clothing in the trunks
in the downstairs bedroom. (9/18/19 Tr., p. 207, L. 25 – p. 208, L. 24; p. 210, Ls. 12-15;
p. 212, Ls. 8-14; p. 219, Ls. 4-15; p. 219, L. 25 – p. 220, L. 4.) Wilson stated that he
normally carried the IDs found on the floor in the bedroom by the baggie (both his and
Tabatha New’s) in his wallet. (9/18/19 Tr., p. 208, L. 25 – p. 209, L. 24.) Wilson
specifically told the detective that the controlled substances found in the downstairs
bedroom were not Tabatha New’s. (9/18/19 Tr., p. 214, L. 24 – p. 215, L. 19.)
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From this evidence the jury could reasonably infer that Wilson, jointly or
exclusively, actually or constructively possessed the methamphetamine in both the baggie
on the floor and the methamphetamine in the baggie in the flashlight in the trunk. First,
both baggies were found in the room Wilson was staying in as an overnight guest. Second,
both baggies were found among Wilson’s other belongings; the baggie on the floor with
items Wilson carried in his wallet and the baggie in the flashlight in a trunk where he kept
his clothing. Third, Wilson specifically told the officers that the methamphetamine did not
belong to Tabatha New, the other occupant of the room whose possessions were also on
the floor and in the trunk, from which the jury could both eliminate New as the possessor
of the methamphetamine and infer that Wilson was aware of the presence of the
methamphetamine. If the jury accepted the evidence on these three points (which this
Court must do based on the standard of review), the conclusion that Wilson actually or
constructively possessed the methamphetamine is reasonable.
In arguing to the contrary, Wilson claims the evidence shows (1) there were three
people in the house, (2) that the two baggies found in his room “appeared to be empty,” (3)
the baggie in the flashlight was not within his “plain view,” and (4) there was “joint
occupancy” of the room in question. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-10.) This argument is
without merit because: (1) Even though there were other people present in the house, one
of the others was not an occupant of the room and Wilson told officers the
methamphetamine did not belong to the other occupant of the room, leaving Wilson as the
only occupant of the room who could have possessed the methamphetamine. In addition,
the jury could reasonably have found joint possession. (2) Contrary to Wilson’s assertion,
the baggies did not appear to be empty. Officers testified they could see what looked like
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methamphetamine in the baggies. (9/18/19 Tr., p. 171, Ls. 15-21; p. 173, Ls. 8-13; p. 204,
Ls. 4-11.) (3) Although not in Wilson’s view when the police found him, the baggie in the
flashlight was in a trunk Wilson used to store his clothes. Certainly Wilson did not
dispossess himself of his own clothes because he could not at some point see them because
they were in a container. (4) Although New’s identification (as well as additional contents
of Wilson’s wallet) were with the baggie on the floor and the baggie in the flashlight was
being stored in a trunk with New’s (and Wilson’s) clothing, Wilson told officers that the
methamphetamine did not belong to New.

Moreover, joint possession of the

methamphetamine does not negate the element of possession. The alleged deficiencies in
the evidence do not render the overall evidence insufficient to support the conviction.
Wilson’s argument depends on this Court ignoring incriminating evidence and
drawing inferences in his favor, both of which are contrary to applicable legal standards.
Applying the correct legal analysis, review of the record shows substantial evidence
supporting the verdict.
II.
Wilson’s Claim Of Fundamental Error Arising From The Prosecution’s Alleged Use Of
His Silence To Infer His Guilt Or To Impeach Him Is Without Merit Because There Is
No Evidence Wilson Ever Invoked His Right To Silence
A.

Introduction
Wilson testified in his own defense. (9/19/19 Tr., p. 68, Ls. 19-25.) He admitted

having lived in the house the officers searched until four days before execution of the
search warrant and that he was sleeping in the downstairs bedroom on the morning in
question, but generally denied knowledge or possession of the baggies and their contents.
(9/19/19 Tr., p. 69, L. 1 – p. 76, L. 19.) During cross examination the prosecutor asked,
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and Wilson confirmed, statements Wilson had made to the officers when they executed the
search warrant. (9/19/19 Tr., p. 78, L. 3 – p. 79, L. 6.) The prosecutor then asked about
factual claims he made in his testimony that he had not claimed when talking to the police,
such as a claim that the baggie on the floor may have fallen from a blanket when Wilson
placed the blanket on the bed. (9/19/19 Tr., p. 79, L. 7 – p. 80, L. 10.) The prosecutor’s
cross-examination ended by asking whether Wilson had told the prosecutor his suspicion
that the baggie on the floor fell from the blanket he borrowed:
Q. No. Okay. But nobody’s ever bothered to come to the State and say,
“Hey, we might have something here,” have they?
A. No, I didn’t think –
MS. HARRINGTON: Until today.
(9/19/19 Tr., p. 80, Ls. 11-18.)
The defense did not object to this line of questioning. In re-direct questioning,
however, defense counsel elicited testimony that neither Wilson’s prior counsel nor the
prosecutor had ever invited Wilson to provide statements about the events in question to
the state and that officers never asked him about the facts he did not tell them at the time,
but later testified about. (9/19/19 Tr., p. 81, Ls. 11-22.) Defense counsel also argued this
point in closing argument. (9/19/19 Tr., p. 102, L. 14 – p. 103, L. 1.)
In rebuttal closing argument the prosecutor commented on this evidence, asserting
that Wilson had “all the time in the world” to present the “blanket theory,” but did so only
after hiring an attorney and going through “the work, time, and expense of a jury trial.”
(9/19/19 Tr., p. 110, L. 11 – p. 111, L. 2.) The defense did not object to this argument.
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For the first time on appeal Wilson contends the prosecutor’s questioning about
differences between his statements to the police and his testimony, and asking him if he
ever provided a statement to “the State,” constitute fundamental error. (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 11-17.) He further argues that the prosecutor’s argument about not informing the state
of the blanket theory constituted fundamental error. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 20-24.) His
arguments fail because (1) cross-examining him about differences in his statement to police
and his testimony was proper and therefore not fundamental error, (2) because asking and
arguing whether Wilson provided a statement to the prosecution was not fundamental error
and (3) the argument based on the unobjected-to cross-examination was not fundamental
error.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time on

appeal.” State v. Papse, 167 Idaho 429, ___, 470 P.3d 1238, 1240 (Ct. App. 2020).
“Alleged constitutional errors during trial that are not followed by a contemporaneous
objection must be reviewed under the fundamental error doctrine.” State v. Medina, 165
Idaho 501, 505, 447 P.3d 949, 953 (2019) (quotation marks omitted).

To show

fundamental error doctrine, the appellant must demonstrate that “the defendant’s unwaived
constitutional rights were violated,” that the error was “clear and obvious,” and that the
error “actually affected the outcome of the trial.” State v. Saenz, 167 Idaho 443, ___, 470
P.3d 1252, 1256 (Ct. App. 2020). As to the requirement that the error be clear on the
record, “the record must contain evidence of the error and the record must also contain
evidence as to whether or not trial counsel made a tactical decision in failing to object.”
State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 115, 119, 443 P.3d 129, 133 (2019).
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C.

Cross-Examination About Differences Between Statements To The Police And
Testimony At Trial Was Proper And Therefore Not Fundamental Error
The state may not use a defendant’s invocation of the right to silence to either create

an inference of guilt or to impeach a defendant’s trial testimony. In this case the prosecutor
did not use Wilson’s invocation of the right to silence for either purpose because Wilson
never invoked his right to silence but instead waived that right and made statements to the
officers. Wilson’s claim that the prosecutor committed fundamental error by crossexamining him about differences between his statements to police and his testimony at trial
fails all three prongs of the fundamental error test because it was proper cross-examination.
The Constitution “forbids … comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence”
in order to draw an inference of guilt. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
However, if the comment is not to draw an inference of guilt, such as where the
“prosecutor’s reference to the defendant’s opportunity to testify is a fair response to a claim
made by defendant or his counsel,” then “there is no violation.” United States v. Robinson,
485 U.S. 25, 32 (1988). In addition, choosing to answer governmental questions generally
waives the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S.
420, 427 (1984), and merely standing mute is generally insufficient to invoke the privilege,
Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 186-87 (2013).
In addition, “the use for impeachment purposes of petitioners’ silence, at the time
of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violate[s] the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976). See
also -----State v.
- --McMurry, 143 Idaho 312, 314, 143 P.3d 400, 402 (Ct. App. 2006) (“A prosecutor may not
… introduce evidence of the defendant’s pre-arrest silence during a ‘custodial
interrogation’ or post-arrest silence for the purpose of inferring admission of guilt.”). This
10

rule, however, “does not apply to cross-examination that merely inquires into prior
inconsistent statements.” Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408 (1980). If the defendant
waives his Miranda rights and speaks with an officer, cross-examination “makes no unfair
use of silence” because “[a]s to the subject matter of his statements, the defendant has not
remained silent at all.” -Id. --See --also --------------United States v. Donnat, 311 F.3d 99, 104 (1st Cir.
2002) (“when a defendant has given a post-arrest statement to the police, Doyle does not
bar a prosecutor from inquiring about the defendant’s failure to tell the police the
exculpatory story he presented at trial, if that story is inconsistent with the post-arrest
statement”).
The Idaho Court of Appeals has addressed the application of these standards in the
fundamental error context in State v. Galvan, 156 Idaho 379, 326 P.3d 1029 (Ct. App.
2014). In that case the prosecutor elicited evidence that Galvan had not responded to an
officer’s question about whether he had a firearm, cross-examined Galvan regarding
whether he had denied having a firearm when asked by the officer, and in closing argument
contended an innocent person would have denied having the firearm. Id. at 382-83, 326
P.3d. at 1032-33. The Court of Appeals applied the holding of Salinas, supra, and
concluded there was no Fifth Amendment violation because “[a] defendant does not invoke
[the privilege against compelled self-incrimination] ‘by simply standing mute.’” Id. at 382,
326 P.3d at 1032 (quoting Salinas, 570 U.S. at 181).
The same result applies here. The prosecutor did not, and indeed could not, use
Wilson’s invocation of his right to silence to either infer his guilt or to impeach his
testimony because Wilson never invoked his right to silence. Wilson’s claim of a violation
of his Fifth Amendment rights is without merit.
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The Galvan court then addressed whether Galvan had shown a due process
violation under Doyle, supra. The court noted a split among the federal circuits about
whether a defendant’s refusal to answer certain questions after waiving Miranda rights was
a re-invocation of those rights such that cross-examination regarding failure to answer
those questions was proper, with some courts holding that it was proper to inquire about a
defendant’s silence in response to certain questions following a Miranda waiver. Id. at
386, 326 P.3d at 1036. The court then denied Galvan’s claim of fundamental error because
the lack of legal clarity on the issue meant the claimed error was not clear on the record.
Id.
At a minimum, Wilson’s claim of fundamental error fails for the same reason as
Galvan’s did. However, Wilson’s claim is not even as good as Galvan’s. In Galvan there
was evidence that Galvan “wouldn’t respond” to questions about the firearm, and the
prosecutor argued that a “reasonable person” would “adamantly state that it never
happened.” Id. at 382-83, 326 P.3d at 1032-33. Here, however, Wilson claimed that he
failed to tell the officers certain details regarding events because the officer never asked.
(9/19/19 Tr., p. 81, Ls. 20-22.) Although some courts have interpreted a refusal to answer
questions as a re-invocation of Miranda rights, mere omission of facts from a statement
actually made cannot on any logical level be considered invocation of Miranda rights.
Wilson waived his Miranda rights and spoke to police about the subject matter of
this case. (9/18/19 Tr., p. 207, L. 25 – p. 208, L. 5.) The prosecutor therefore violated no
constitutional right by cross-examining Wilson about differences between Wilson’s
statements to the police and his testimony to the jury. Because Wilson waived his Miranda
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rights and was not silent, there was neither an inference of guilt from silence nor
impeachment based on an invocation of rights.
D.

The Prosecutor’s Question About Why Wilson Did Not “Come To The State” With
His Version Of Events Is Not Fundamental Error
Unlike questions about differences in the statements to the police and his testimony,

the question, “But nobody’s ever bothered to come to the State and say, ‘Hey, we might
have something here,’ have they?” (9/19/19 Tr., p. 80, Ls. 14-16), was objectionable. It
was not, however, fundamental error.
First, the error is not clear on the record because rather than object, defense counsel
chose to ask Wilson on re-direct examination whether Wilson was represented by counsel
during the pendency of the case, whether counsel had advised him to not talk to the
prosecutor, and whether the prosecutor had asked for a statement. (9/19/19 Tr., p. 81, Ls.
11-19.) Defense counsel also addressed this issue in closing argument, contending trial
was “the only place” he could tell his story after making a statement to the police. (9/19/19
Tr., p. 102, L. 14 – p. 103, L. 1.) Rather than evidence that trial counsel did not make a
tactical decision in failing to object, Miller, 165 Idaho at 119, 443 P.3d at 133, the record
strongly suggests the counsel tactically chose to address the issue in cross-examination and
closing argument rather than object to its having been raised. If, as Wilson claims on
appeal, the question was clearly and obviously objectionable, then counsel’s choice to
address it through questioning and argument suggests a tactical decision. See State v. Kerr,
163 Idaho 656, 659, 417 P.3d 982, 985 (Ct. App. 2018).
Second, Wilson has not shown the alleged error “actually affected the outcome of
the trial.” Saenz, 167 Idaho at ___ 470 P.3d at 1256. The only differences between
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Wilson’s statements to the police and his testimony ultimately highlighted by the
prosecutor was Wilson’s trial claim that the reason he did not open the door was because
the room was dark and the light switch was outside the room; where a torn portion of a
plastic bag found in his pocket had come from; and that he had put blankets on the bed in
the dark that night. (9/19/19 Tr., p. 79, L. 7 – p. 80, L 18. 1) There is no reason to believe
the jury inferred guilt from Wilson’s failure to alert the prosecution about these alleged
factual omissions in his statements to the officers.
In contending there was fundamental error, Wilson argues the record disproves a
tactical choice because such can never be a tactical choice. (Appellant’s brief, p. 16 (“No
reasonable jurist would want this evidence before the jury because this evidence allows the
jury to infer guilt from the defendant’s exercise of his constitutional rights.”). However,
whether the tactical choice was reasonable is a matter for post-conviction litigation. It is
not alone enough to demonstrate the absence of a tactical choice. Papse, 167 Idaho at ___,
470 P.3d at 1243 (“Asserting that the lack of objection was not beneficial or that an
objection could or should have been made is inadequate” to show the second prong of the
fundamental error test). Wilson also argues that “[i]f Mr. Wilson’s counsel had recognized
that the prosecutor improperly used his silence to imply guilt during her cross-examination
of Mr. Wilson, defense counsel would have objected to this misconduct because exclusion
of that argument would have helped Mr. Wilson’s case.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 16.) This
argument amounts to a tacit admission that the error was not clear. See Kerr, 163 Idaho at
659, 417 P.3d at 985 (if error is clear, it is likely that trial counsel knew of the error and

1

The defense theory was that the baggie on the floor could have fallen out of the blankets.
(9/19/19 Tr., p. 104, L. 24 – p. 105, L. 2.)
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made a tactical decision whether to object). Both of Wilson’s arguments fail to show it is
clear on the record that counsel did not make a tactical decision.
As to prejudice, Wilson asserts that the prosecutor’s question “informed the jury
that Mr. Wilson did not explain the throwing the blanket on the bed in the dark situation to
Detective DeBie or the prosecutor because he knew he was guilty,” and that the only
evidence of possession “was his proximity” to the methamphetamine. (Appellant’s brief,
p. 17.) Neither of these assertion are true. First, the obvious import of the prosecution’s
question was to point out that Wilson was presenting, for the first time at trial, a claim that
the methamphetamine fell from the blankets. There is no inference that he was withholding
exculpatory facts because he knew he was guilty; the only reasonable inference from the
questioning and argument was that he was fabricating new facts to strengthen his defense.
Second, Wilson’s claim that the state relied on proximity alone to establish possession is
false, as shown in Section I, supra. Wilson has failed to show that the prosecutor’s single
objectionable question about not informing the state about the additional facts he claimed
for the first time at trial “actually affected the outcome of the trial.” Saenz,
- - - 167 Idaho at
___ 470 P.3d at 1256.
In his testimony at trial Wilson presented factual assertions that he did not include
in his statements to the police, attempting to present a new theory of where the
methamphetamine came from. The prosecutor properly cross-examined him about those
factual assertions not being included in his prior statements. The only improper questioning
went to why Wilson had not alerted the state to the additions before the trial, while the case
was pending. Although the latter was improper, the record does not establish that the lack
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of objection was not tactical and does not show that the question (and evidence thus
elicited) affected the verdict.
E.

The Prosecutor’s Argument Regarding The “Blanket Theory,” Based On
Unobjected-To Cross-Examination, Was Not Fundamental Error
The prosecutor’s argument that Wilson failed to notify the state about the “blanket

theory” prior to trial was based on cross-examination conducted without objection.
(Compare 9/19/19 Tr., p. 80, Ls. 11-18 with 9/19/19 Tr., p. 110, L. 11 – p. 111, L. 2.)
Because the evidence came in without objection, it was not fundamental error to refer to
that evidence in closing argument. 2 See State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, ___, 462 P.3d
1125, 1142 (2020) (not misconduct to discuss photos admitted at trial even though
admission of the photographs was erroneous); State v. Carsner, 126 Idaho 911, 919, 894
P.2d 144, 152 (Ct. App. 1995) (argument based on evidence admitted without objection
not fundamental error under prior fundamental error standard).
Even if it was improper to argue that the “blanket theory” was not credible because
not presented until trial, the record does not show clear error or prejudice for the reasons
stated in relation to the cross-examination about the same topic.

2

The state addresses Wilson’s arguments that the argument was improper for other reasons
below.
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III.
Wilson’s Claim The Prosecutor’s Comment On His Failure To Call A Witness Was
Fundamental Error Is Contrary To Established Law
A.

Introduction
During closing argument, defense counsel attempted to cast suspicion on Jacqulyn

Jensen, the homeowner, as the most likely owner of the methamphetamine. (9/19/19 Tr.,
p. 100, Ls. 8-21; p. 104, Ls. 6-11; p. 107, Ls. 1-7.) In reply, the prosecutor, in part, argued,
“They could have brought Jacqulyn Jensen here today. If this was hers, where is she?
She’s not here. If this was hers, why didn’t the defense call her?” (9/19/19 Tr., p. 108, Ls.
16-19.) Wilson did not object. (Id.)
For the first time on appeal Wilson contends that the above-quoted argument
constituted an “attempt to place [the state’s] burden to prove Mr. Wilson committed the
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt back [sic] onto Mr. Wilson.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 18-19.) Wilson has failed to show error, much less fundamental
error.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time on

appeal.” Papse, 167 Idaho at ___, 470 P.3d at 1240. “Alleged constitutional errors during
trial that are not followed by a contemporaneous objection must be reviewed under the
fundamental error doctrine.” Medina, 165 Idaho at 505, 447 P.3d at 953 (quotation marks
omitted). To show fundamental error, the appellant must demonstrate that “the defendant’s
unwaived constitutional rights were violated,” that the error was “clear and obvious,” and
that the error “actually affected the outcome of the trial.” Saenz, 167 Idaho at ___, 470
P.3d at 1256. As to the requirement that the error be clear on the record, “the record must
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contain evidence of the error and the record must also contain evidence as to whether or
not trial counsel made a tactical decision in failing to object.” Miller, 165 Idaho at 119,
443 P.3d at 133.
C.

The Prosecutor’s Comment On Wilson’s Failure To Call Jacqulyn Jensen Was
Proper Under Established Law
It is not improper for the prosecution to comment “on the failure of the defense to

introduce material evidence or to call logical witnesses.” State v. Hodges, 105 Idaho 588,
592, 671 P.2d 1051, 1055 (1983) (quotations omitted). “[A] prosecutor’s comment on a
defendant’s failure to call a witness does not shift the burden of proof, and is therefore
permissible, so long as the prosecutor does not violate the defendant’s Fifth Amendment
rights by commenting on the defendant’s failure to testify.” State v. Mendoza, 151 Idaho
623, 627, 262 P.3d 266, 270 (Ct. App. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). Far from being
fundamental error, the argument was proper.
In making his argument Wilson does not address the contrary controlling authority
cited above, cites no relevant authority, and presents no logical analysis of how the
argument reduced the state’s burden of proof. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 18-20.) Wilson has
failed on all three elements of his fundamental error claim.
IV.
Wilson Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Prosecutor’s Closing Argument
A.

Introduction
In closing, defense counsel stated the jury “heard the State saying my client didn’t

come forward to tell them this story until today.” (9/19/19 Tr., p. 102, Ls. 14-15.) Counsel
responded to this characterization of the state’s argument by contending that “[t]oday’s the
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only day that he’s had a chance to say this. Today, this trial, is the only place ….” (9/19/19
Tr., p. 102, Ls. 15-17.) In rebuttal the prosecutor said without objection:
Now, this trial is not the only place that the defendant had to tell his story.
But now, instead, he hires an attorney, pays the attorney, goes through the
work, time, and expense of a jury trial instead. Ladies and gentlemen, that
makes no sense. He then gets up and tells the blanket story. I’m going to
call it the blanket theory.
Why would he tell the blanket story unless he’s trying to imply -- because,
of course, he said that it was near the bathroom, because that’s where we
know that Jensen had her meth safe. Okay? So he’s trying to imply clearly
that somehow it was inside those blankets, and they shook them out, and it
was all dark, and, “I don’t know. I don’t know where it came from. It’s just
not mine.” Okay?
He had all the time in the world to explain that to the police officers, all the
time in the world before the work and expense of this trial to tell someone,
and he didn’t. Instead, he came in here.
(9/19/2019 Tr., p. 110, L. 11 – p. 111, L. 2.)
On appeal, Wilson contends this argument is fundamental error. (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 20-27.) Specifically, he claims the argument violated his right to silence (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 20-22 3), attacked his decision to go to trial (Appellant’s brief, p. 22-24), and
disparaged his defense (Appellant’s brief, pp. 24-27).

Wilson has failed to show

fundamental error because, even if objectionable, Wilson has failed to show constitutional
error that is clear on the record and prejudicial.
B.

Standard Of Review
“‘Where prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to at trial, Idaho appellate

courts may only order a reversal when the defendant demonstrates that the violation in
question qualifies as fundamental error ....’” State v. Godwin, 164 Idaho 903, 926, 436

3

This argument was addressed above in section II.E., supra.
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P.3d 1252, 1275 (2019) (quoting State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979
(2010)). “Fundamental error is error that: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the
failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.” State v. Lankford, 162
Idaho 477, 494, 399 P.3d 804, 821 (2017) (quotation marks omitted).
C.

Wilson Has Failed To Demonstrate An Attack On The Choice To Go To Trial
Amounting To Fundamental Error
The prosecutor commented that, rather than alert the police or the state to his claim

that the methamphetamine belonged to Jensen, the homeowner, so that the matter could be
resolved in her case with her guilty plea, Wilson had hired an attorney and had gone to
trial. (9/19/19 Tr., p. 110, L. 11 – p. 111, L. 2.) Although the comment on hiring an
attorney and choosing to go to trial was improper (as opposed to the comment on not telling
the police, which was proper), it was not fundamental error.
Wilson has failed to show the first prong of his fundamental error claim, that the
argument violated a constitutional right. Wilson generally cites to his due process rights,
the prohibition against making arguments not based on the evidence, and making
“inappropriate inferences.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 22-23 (citing State v. Severson, 147
Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009).) However, not every improper argument,
including making “inappropriate inferences,” is of constitutional significance. See Perry,
150 Idaho at 230, 245 P.3d at 982 (improper argument “did not clearly violate any of
Perry’s constitutional rights”). Wilson has failed to cite any cases holding that commenting
on the facts that Defendant secured representation and took his case to trial (both obvious
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to the jury hearing the case) are constitutionally prohibited arguments as oppose to merely
irrelevant. Because the choice to be represented and to go to trial leads to no inference of
guilt, comment on the choice to exercise those rights, although objectionable, does not rise
to an infringement on due process.
Second, the error is not clear, including the record showing that the lack of
objection was not tactical. The record shows defense counsel made objections at other
points in the prosecutor’s closing argument. (9/19/19 Tr., p. 108, Ls. 10-15; p. 112, L. 25
– p. 113, L. 3.) Nothing in the record suggests that the decision to not object to this
particular argument was not a tactical decision.
Wilson argues the error is plain because the “prosecutorial misconduct in this case
is plain on its face, and there is simply no strategic or tactical advantage to be gained by
allowing the prosecutor to attack Mr. Wilson’s decision to go to trial.” (Appellant’s brief,
p. 23.) However, his inability to cite a case factually similar to this case shows the alleged
constitutional error is not plain. Moreover, his mere declaration there is no advantage to
refraining from objecting is not the required affirmative demonstration of clear error.
Miller,
---

165 Idaho at 119, 443 P.3d at 133 (“the record must also contain evidence as to

whether or not trial counsel made a tactical decision in failing to object”).
Finally, Wilson’s claim of prejudice is without merit. The improper argument was
not likely to engender any prejudice in light of the record and facts of the case. Every jury
knows whether a defendant has invoked a right to counsel because counsel is present in the
court and representing the defendant. Likewise, the jury knew Wilson was taking
advantage of his right to a trial. Hiring a lawyer and going to trial is not something that
suggests guilt; the innocent would certainly do the same. There is nothing in the record
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showing that pointing out the facts that Wilson was represented by counsel and had taken
the charges against him to trial affected the outcome of the trial.
Wilson contends “[t]he prosecutor was attempting to inflame the jury by implying
that Mr. Wilson was wasting the jurors’, the prosecutor’s, [and] the district court’s time by
insisting on taking the case to trial.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 23.) This claim of prejudice is
merely speculation. First, as noted above, there is no reason to believe that hiring a lawyer
and going to trial suggests guilt. Second, nothing in the record suggests the jury would
have held a grudge against Wilson for electing to have a trial and electing to be represented
at it, much less that this would have affected their verdict. Finally, the jurors were
instructed it was their “duty to decide what the facts are and to apply those facts to the
law,” and that “[n]either sympathy nor prejudice should influence you in your
deliberations.” (R., pp. 130, 145.) “On appeal, we presume that the jury followed the
district court’s instructions.” State v. Richardson, 168 Idaho 25, ___, 478 P.3d 754, 760
(Ct. App. 2020). Wilson has failed to demonstrate any prong of his fundamental error
claim.
V.
Wilson Has Failed To Demonstrate A Disparagement Of His Defense Amounting To
Fundamental Error
A.

Introduction
In closing argument Wilson’s trial counsel stated that the defense did not “dispute

that it’s methamphetamine” even though the jury “saw us throughout the trial today playing
lawyer games” by asserting “objections to this and to that.” (9/19/19 Tr., p. 103, Ls. 1519.) In rebuttal closing the prosecutor argued, without objection, that the defense had
“[fought] the State on the lab report” for “half an hour,” and when the defense “couldn’t
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keep that out” the defense had to “take more drastic measures” in claiming that the
methamphetamine belonged to the owner of the house, Jacqulyn Jensen. (9/19/19 Tr., p.
111, Ls. 3-25.) For the first time on appeal, Wilson contends “[t]he prosecutor’s comments
misrepresenting and disparaging the defense’s theory of the case violated Mr. Wilson’s
right to a fair trial and his right to present a defense.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 24-27.)
Review of his claim shows no fundamental error.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Where a defendant alleges a constitutional violation occurred during trial, but

failed to make a contemporaneous objection, Idaho appellate courts apply the fundamental
error doctrine.” State v. Alvarado, No. 47341, 2021 WL 626979, at *4 (Idaho Feb. 18,
2021). “To successfully show fundamental error” an appellant must show that “[o]ne or
more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights was violated;” that “[t]he error is
clear or obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in the
appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision;” and “[t]he error affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.” State v.
Haggard, 166 Idaho 858, ___, 465 P.3d 1097, 1100 (2020).
C.

Wilson Has Not Demonstrated Fundamental Error
Although “disparaging comments about opposing counsel” are objectionable, they

are not necessarily fundamental error. State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 289, 178 P.3d
644, 654 (Ct. App. 2007) (finding that prosecutor’s comments “disparaged defense
counsel’s argument in this case and the role of criminal defense attorneys in general” but
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the error was not fundamental under prior fundamental error standard). Although the
prosecutor’s argument may have been objectionable, it was not a constitutional error, the
error is not clear on the record, and there is no showing of prejudice.
First, there was no constitutional error clear on the record. Not every improper
argument is of constitutional significance. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 245 P.3d at 982
(improper argument “did not clearly violate any of Perry’s constitutional rights”). Defense
counsel himself had admitted playing “lawyer games” during the trial. The prosecutor’s
response did not rise to the level of suggesting the jury would decide the case based on
something other than an evaluation of the evidence.
Second, it is not clear on the record whether defense counsel made a tactical
decision to not object. Miller, 165 Idaho at 119, 443 P.3d at 133 (“the record must also
contain evidence as to whether or not trial counsel made a tactical decision in failing to
object”). Counsel himself had stated he was playing “lawyer games” and therefore had
reason to believe an objection to the prosecutor’s response to that point would be negatively
viewed by the jury or be rejected by the trial judge.
Finally, the record does not show that the challenged argument “affected the
outcome of the trial proceedings.” Haggard, 166 Idaho at ___, 465 P.3d at 1100. Defense
counsel put forward the idea of “lawyer games,” and there is no reason to believe that the
jury decided this case based on those games instead of on its reasonable view of the
evidence.
In claiming fundamental error, Wilson contends any argument based on anything
other than the facts and the law is a due process violation. (Appellant’s brief, p. 26 (citing
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979).) However, it is not true that any improper
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argument violates a constitutional due process right. Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 245 P.3d at
982 (improper “vouching” argument no clear constitutional error); Lankford, 162 Idaho at
498, 399 P.3d at 825 (“vouching statements, although constituting prosecutorial
misconduct, do not constitute a clear constitutional violation”). “The relevant question is
whether the prosecutor’s comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the
resulting conviction a denial of due process.” State v. Kirk, 157 Idaho 809, 812, 339 P.3d
1213, 1216 (Ct. App. 2014). Even if the argument was objectionable, Wilson has failed to
show that the prosecutor’s argument rose to the level of a clear due process violation.
As to whether the error is clear, Wilson argues that “[g]iven that Mr. Wilson
exercised his right to a jury trial, there was no strategic or tactical reason to allow the
prosecutor to denigrate the defense of his case.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 27.) The fact Wilson
presented a defense is not enough to show a lack of a tactical decision regarding whether
to object to the prosecutor’s argument. Moreover, as shown above, defense counsel first
interjected the notion of “lawyer games,” a fact on the record unaddressed by Wilson on
appeal.
Finally, Wilson has failed to show that the challenged argument affected the
outcome of the trial. For this argument Wilson contends that the state’s evidence showing
actual or constructive possession was “weak.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 27.) While the
strength of the state’s case is certainly relevant to this inquiry, the argument that alleged
weakness of the evidence alone proves that an improper argument affected the outcome of
the trial is without merit. Moreover, as shown above, the evidence showing actual or
constructive possession is sufficient (or even strong) to support the verdict. There is no
reason to accept generally or in this case that because of any alleged weakness in the
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evidence the verdict must be explained by an improper argument. Wilson has failed to
show fundamental error on the record.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of conviction.
DATED this 26th day of March, 2021.
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